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Abstract
This paper studies the welfare implications of equilibrium behavior in a market charac-
terized by competition between two interconnected telecommunication ￿rms, subject to
constraints: the customers belong to a social network. It also shows that social networks
matter because equilibrium prices and welfare critically depend on how people are socially
related. Next, the model is used to study e⁄ectiveness of alternative regulatory schemes.
The standard regulated environement, in which the authority de￿nes interconnection ac-
cess charges as being equal to marginal costs and ￿nal prices are left to the market, is
considered as a benchmark . Then, we focus on the performance of two di⁄erent regula-
tory interventions. First, access prices are set below marginal costs to foster competition.
Second, switching costs are reduced to intensify competition. The results show that the
second strategy is more efective to obtain equilibrium prices closer to Ramsey￿ s level.
JEL codes: C70, D43, D60
Keywords: Access charges, social networks, random regular graphs.
1 Introduction
Over the last years several articles have been focused on the study of the equilibrium
interconnection strategies in telecommunication markets, in a framework where hetero-
geneity of consumers is recognized (see for example Dessein (2004) and Hahn (2004),
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elaci￿n MatemÆtica (ghernandez@dim.uchile.cl); Muæoz: Universidad TØcnica Federico Santa Mar￿a, De-
partamento de Industrias (roberto.munoz@usm.cl). Roberto Muæoz thanks the support of FONDECYT,
research project number 11060033.
1among others).1 This approach has been a signi￿cant improvement in the e⁄ort to obtain
more realistic models. However, the social network structure among consumers has been
mostly ignored, and heterogeneity has been usually motivated on the grounds of di⁄erent
propensities to make calls accross consumers. In this paper, we recognize that the position
in a social network a⁄ects the amount of calls a typical consumer can make. Naturally, a
more connected individual would make more calls than a hermit. Moreover, the number
of calls to any particular member in the network should depend not only on prices, but
also on how close they are in social terms.
In this context, we study a market characterized by competition between two inter-
connected telecommunication ￿rms, with particular emphasis on the constraint that cus-
tomers belong to a social network. We consider, as usual, that a ￿rm A has two sources of
revenues: its customer￿payments and the access charges that a rival ￿rm B pays to A in
order to complete calls originated in B but terminated in A. Our benchmark case consists
of the standard regulated environment where interconnection access charges are de￿ned by
the authority as equal to marginal costs, while ￿nal prices are left to the market. In this
environment we show that social structure matters, because equilibrium prices, consumer
surplus and producer surplus depend on network characteristics. Then, we study the
efectiveness of two alternative regulatory interventions. First, access prices are set below
marginal costs to enhance competition. Second, switching costs are reduced to intensify
competition, while access charges remain at marginal costs levels. The simplest model
corresponds to the case when both ￿rms are single service providers and they are con-
strained to o⁄er linear prices schemes in a nondiscriminatory way. In this sense, the closest
model corresponds to Harrison et al. (2006), where the di⁄erential e⁄ect of regulated v/s
unregulated frameworks is studied. Our analysis, however, di⁄ers from theirs in several
important aspects. First, the initial focus here is on the role of social networks over the
outcome, keeping the regulatory environment constant. Second, we introduce the study of
welfare e⁄ects of competition policy among interconnected ￿rms in the presence of a social
network among customers. Third, we study regulatory interventions which -though they
depart from the benchmark case- are feasible under standard regulatory environments.
Interestingly, our results show that a regulatory intervention focused on reducing access
charges below marginal costs enhances welfare. However, the alternative policy interven-
tion focused on reducing switching costs is much more e⁄ective. Welfare also increases
when the social network is more dense, but this characteristic of the network can not be
subject to policy implications.
The welfare e⁄ect of both policies is compared to another benchmark given by the
Ramsey solution, which characterize the second best scenario (see La⁄ont et al. (1998a)).
A comparison with expected results in a collusive scenario is also discussed and it shows
1For an excellent review of the literature see Armstrong (2002). The seminal papers are La⁄ont et al.
(1998a,b) and Armstrong (1998).
2that regulation is mandatory. In fact, it is more neccesary when the social network is
more dense.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we develop the economic
model, including the agent￿ s demand, the ￿rms￿problem and the game played by the two
￿rms. In section 3 we establish the welfare considerations for the analysis. In section 4
we report numerical results and the main conclusions are stated in section 5.
2 The Economic Model
In the model we assume the existence of a social network, represented by graph g. Nodes in
the graph represent agents (indexed by i 2 I) and a link between a pair of agents represent
a social connection between them. The graph g is generated using random regular graphs
(see Bollobas (2001)), where the connectivity degree d of graph g represents the average
number of social connections accross agents.
There are two ￿rms, A and B, o⁄ering horizontally di⁄erentiated communication ser-
vices (for example two wireless companies) and consumers have to decide which ￿rm to
subscribe to. In order to make the a¢ liation decision, agents take into account the pricing
schemes o⁄ered by each ￿rm and her own preferences for the services provided. It is as-
sumed that the ￿rms￿pricing schemes are constrained to be linear and nondiscriminatory.
On the other hand, the preferences are modeled in a way similar to a standard Hotelling
horizontally di⁄erentiated model: each agent i in the social network (i.e. each node in g)
is endowed with a realization of a taste variable xi, randomly assigned from a uniform
grid with support in [0;1]: In what follows we assume that ￿rm A is ￿located￿in 0 and
￿rm B in 1. None of them provide the ￿ideal service￿to agent i; positioned in xi, unless
xi itself be zero or one.
2.1 The Agent Demand
Consider the a¢ liation decision problem of agent i: If she decides to subscribe ￿rm l =
A;B then we will say that she belongs to the set Il ￿ I of subscribers to l. Agent i￿ s
demand for calls is represented by the vector qi = (qij)j2I;j6=i, where the generic element
qij is the number of calls that agent i makes to agent j: Then the gross utility of agent i












2It is convenient to note that the funtional form of u(￿) is standard in the literature (see La⁄ont et al
(1998 a,b).
3￿ : represents a utility discount factor when agent i calls other agents located farther in
network g. Accordingly, it satis￿es 0 < ￿ < 1:
tij : it is the shortest distance (in terms of links) connecting agents i and j with i 6= j. We
consider tij 2 I N so that if the agents are direct neighbors, the discount factor is ￿
0 = 1.
On the other hand if agents i and j are not connected, then tij ￿ 1.
￿ : is a constant parameter that represents elasticity of demand, which is assumed to be
greater than 1 and independent of j.
Suppose that after observing the prices o⁄ered by the ￿rms, pA and pB, agent i has to
decide which ￿rm to become a¢ liated with. In order to make that decision, she needs to
￿gure out her net consumer surplus in both scenarios. If she decides to a¢ liate with ￿rm























Intuitively, for the same price pA, agent i makes more calls to contacts located closer in
the social network g than to those farther in it. Therefore, plugging into equation 2 we









and an analogous result arises for ￿rm B.
Consider the parameter t that represents the unit cost that agent i; located in xi; has
to incur in order to become a¢ liated with ￿rm A located in 0 or ￿rm B located in 1.
Accordingly, the total cost of selecting a service, eventually di⁄erent from i￿ s preferred











B is preferred. It is important to note that in this model we assume that agent i incurs
in a discounted disutility for calls due to the imperfect matching between her preferences
and the service provided, where the discount appears because the imperfection is more
annoying the closer agent j is to i in the social network. The total cost of imperfect
matching is the sum of all the pairwise discounted costs. In addition, note that the cost to
agent i of an imperfect service to call agent j is assumed to be independent of the number
4of calls.3
The decision of a¢ liation to A or B depends on whether xi is to the right or to the















If xi < x￿
i, that means that agent i prefers ￿rm A even considering that ￿rm A does





tij due to imperfect

























So if xi < x￿
i (resp. xi > x￿
i) then player i joins ￿rm A (resp. B).
2.2 The Firm￿ s Problem
The ￿rms select their prices, pA and pB, simultaneous and independently, in order to
maximize pro￿ts. However, they know that, after observing prices, consumers are going
to make optimal a¢ liation decisions, so the number of clients for each ￿rm is endogenous.
In addition, when they decide prices the level of access charges, aA and aB, are taken as
given. To illustrate the role of these payments, let us discuss aA. Access charge aA is a
unitary fee paid by ￿rm B to ￿rm A so that A may complete a call made by a client of B
to a client of A (analogous for aB). We assume that access charges are de￿ned in a ￿rst
stage, either by the regulatory authority or the ￿rms. In the last case, access charges can
be the result of a competitive process or a collusive agreement among operators.
Assuming that access charges are given by aA and aB, ￿rm A (resp. B) will select its















j2IB qij(pA)(pA ￿ co










3Alternative approaches would be to make the transportation cost dependent on the utility obtained
from the calls or dependent on the number of calls. Our selection is consistent with La⁄ont et al. (1998a).
They do not consider, however, a discount factor because in their model agents are not connected through
a social network.
5where:4
f : is the ￿xed cost incurred by a ￿rm when it a¢ liates a new subscriber.
co
A : is the cost of originating a call for ￿rm A (co
B is de￿ned analogously).
c
f
A : is the cost of terminating or ￿nishing a call for ￿rm A (c
f
B is de￿ned analogously).
aA : is the price or access charge that ￿rm A charges ￿rm B in order to terminate a call
from a subscriber of B to a subscriber of A (aB is de￿ned analogously).
At this stage it is clear that we are facing a non standard optimization problem for
the ￿rms, because sets IA and IB in equation (5), and which contain the consumers
a¢ liated to A and B, respectively, depend on the prices selected. In order to deal with
this complexity, we need to write the problem (5) using nonlinear programming schemes
that are as standard as possible. Let us de￿ne ￿i = 0 if agent i a¢ liates network A and
￿i = 1 if agent i a¢ liates network B. Using this notation, our goal will be to write ￿rm




s:t: H￿ ￿ z; ￿ 2 f0;1gI
Note that the previous structure is not warranted in general, because we are requiring
that a¢ liation decisions be represented by a linear constraint. The gains from obtaining
such a neat representation of the problem are very important. First, we can bound the
level of complexity of the problem; second, we will be able to expand the aplicability of our
model without changing this structure, and third, it helps us to ￿gure out an algorithm
to solve it. With this goal in mind, we separate the problem in two parts. First, we
should write the vector of optimal a¢ liation decisions as the solution of a linear inequality
constraint (H￿ ￿ z; ￿ 2 f0;1gI) and then, we should write the objective function as in
(6), so that we make explicit the dependance of the objective function on the vector of
a¢ liation decisions ￿. The following sections are devoted to these tasks.
2.3 The Constraint
Using the de￿nition of ￿i the optimal a¢ liation decision can be written as:
￿i =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 if xi < x￿
i
0 or 1 if xi = x￿
i
1 if xi > x￿
i
4In what follows, we always assume that ￿rms select prices while consumers make optimal a¢ liation
decisions. Access prices are de￿ned by the regulatory authority unless we explicitely consider a di⁄erent


















Noting that the values of x￿
i do not depend on the a¢ liation decisions of agents other
than i,5 it is easy to see that the previous expression has the following structure:
￿i =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 if bi < 0
0 or 1 if bi = 0
1 if bi > 0
(7)
where bi 2 I R with:

























































The optimal a¢ liation decisions are then formally characterized, but they are still
nonlinear. In order to linearize them, consider M 2 I R+ su¢ ciently high such that, for
given i, constraint (7) is equivalent to the following couple of inequations:6
0 ￿ bi ￿ M￿i (8)
0 ￿ bi + M(1 ￿ ￿i)
5In a companion paper we study the discriminatory case, where x￿
i actually depends on the a¢ liation
decisions of all the agents, and the problem becomes much more complicated.
6A feasible de￿nition of M is given in Appendix I.
7In e⁄ect, when bi < 0 holds, agent i is forced to choose ￿i = 0 otherwise (i.e. by
selecting ￿i = 1) the second inequality in (8) is violated. An analogous argument applies
when bi > 0. In the case when bi = 0 the inequalities in (8) hold with ￿i = 0 or ￿i = 1.





















































































It is convenient to emphasize that H is independent of a particular vector of prices
(pA;pB). On the other hand, z depends on the vector of prices because bi does so for each
i. Accordingly we should write the constraint as: H￿ ￿ z(pA;pB).7
2.4 The Objective Function
Consider the problem for ￿rm A established in equation (5). By replacing the optimal
values for qij de￿ned in equation (3) it becomes:
max
pA￿0




































It is important to remember that the previous structure of the objective function is
inadequate because the sets IA and IB represent the group of consumers a¢ liated to the
7In a companion paper we study the e⁄ect of price discrimination depending on the destiny of the call.
Interestingly, in such case we also obtain a linear representation for the a¢ liation decisions, but matrix
H becomes more complicated because of the presence of network externalities.
8corresponding ￿rms, which are endogenous to the vector of prices (pA;pB): The objective
function can be simpli￿ed by incorporating the variables ￿i identifying the a¢ liation
decisions. If we include the fact that a¢ liation decisions are also optimal for consumers,
we have that ￿rm A￿ s problem is given by:
max
pA￿0





































s:t: H￿ ￿ z(pA;pB), ￿ 2 f0;1gI
where H, z and ￿ were de￿ned in the previous subsection. It is clear that problem (9)
has the structure required in (6).
The analogous problem for Firm B is trivially given by:
max
pB￿0





































s:t: H￿ ￿ z(pA;pB), ￿ 2 f0;1gI
Note that the constraint is the same that in equation (9), even when the objective
function changes according to the de￿nition of ￿i￿ s.
2.5 The Regulatory Interventions
In the subsequent analysis we consider a benchmark case associated with the standard
regulatory approach, where access charges are de￿ned by the authority, and only the ￿nal
prices are the result of market interactions. In this case, the authority selects access charges
as equal to marginal termination costs (i.e. aA = c
f
A and aB = c
f
B). For simplicity we




B. Departing from this benchmark, we have
two alternative regulatory interventions:
91. The authority can set access charges below marginal termination costs to enhance
competition. Under that condition, the ￿rms have an additional incentive to reduce prices,
because a net out￿ ow of calls is more pro￿table than a balanced pattern.
2. The authority can implement policies aimed at reducing switching costs, that is t,
which intensify rivalry to a¢ liate consumers.
We are going to describe how equilibrium is a⁄ected under each regulatory intervention
and then we will perform a comparative analysis for the welfare achieved in both of them
and in relation to reference cases.
3 The Welfare Analysis
The welfare analysis can be constrained to a simple comparison between the results of
both regulatory interventions, but it is illustrative to compare those results with clear
common benchmarks. The ￿rst benchmark considered is given by the standard regulation,
where access charges are ￿xed at marginal termination values and ￿nal prices result from
competition between the ￿rms. A second one is a Ramsey approach, where consumer
surplus is maximized subject to break even constraints. In the last benchmark we consider
the collusive scenario characterized by the monopoly outcome, where competition is absent
but the standard access charge regulation is in place. In this section we discuss the two
last benchmarks.














































Accordingly, total welfare could be de￿ned by:
W(pA;pB) = CS(pA;pB) + ￿A(pA;pB) + ￿B(pA;pB)
And we could evaluate how close is welfare obtained in equilibrium W(p￿
A;p￿
B) from




Unfortunately, consumer surplus can not be directly added to pro￿ts, because the
multiple ways to consider transportation costs in an horizontally di⁄erentiated model
10implies multiple measures for consumer surplus.8 An alternative approach that permit us





￿A(pA;pB) + ￿B(pA;pB) = 0
Where access charges have been set as equal to marginal termination costs. In this
approach we can compare the Ramsey solution, given by equation (12), with the values






Finally, it is also illustrative to use the monopoly case as another benchmark. In this























Where the subindex M denotes monopoly levels.
4 Results
In order to study the role of social networks on welfare in telecommunication markets
with a view to evaluate the relative performance of the two regulatory interventions, we
establish the basic parameters for our simulations in Table 1.
Table 1: Basic Parameters
elasticity of demand ￿￿ = ￿1:2












￿xed cost f = 0:5
number of individuals I = 1000
transportation cost t = 0:5
8See the di⁄erent options mentioned in footnote 3.






















































Figure 2: The impact of Connectivity degree on Consumer Surplus (CS).
All the numbers in Table 1 were selected trying to conform a reasonable setting. For
example, Ingraham and Sidak (2004) have estimated that the elasticity of demand in
US for wireless services is between -1.12 and -1.29. The ￿xed cost (f) has been selected
in order to represent 10% of ARPU (Average Revenue per User). On the other hand,
origination, termination and transportation costs are in the same order of magnitude
than those reported by De Bijl and Peitz (2002) in their simulations. The main algorithm
is reported in Appendix II.
Figure 1 shows how the connectivity degree d a⁄ects both equilibrium prices as well
as Ramsey prices, mainly in the case of low levels of connectivity. However, Figure 2


























Figure 3: The impact of Connectivity degree on Producer Surplus.
d. Although the authority can not read this result as implying a policy intervention to
increase d, it is clear that the gap between the equilibrium and the Ramsey benchmark
can be reduced through regulation, and this is especially relevant for high values of d. On
the other hand, the gap between the Ramsey benchmark and the monopoly case increase
in d, showing that the relevance of the underlying social network, and the importance of
regulation, increases when societies becomes more complex. Finally, Figure 3 shows the
gap between total pro￿ts in competition and monopoly, both of them under the standard
regulated environment. It is clear that ￿rms have a higher incentive to collude when the
connectivity degree increases.
For the analysis of the regulatory interventions, Table 2 summarize the setting for
the parameters. The ￿rst column corresponds to the standard case where regulatory
authorities set access prices as equal to marginal termination costs. The second column
contains the parameters for the Ramsey approach, while the last two columns contain the
settings where the intervention occurs in access charges (scheme 1) and in switching costs
(scheme 2), respectively.
Table 2: Basic Parameters under Regulatory Interventions
Parameters Standard Ramsey Scheme 1 Scheme 2
access charges (aA = aB) 0:75 0:75 < 0:75 0:75
transportation cost (t) 0:5 0:5 0:5 < 0:5








































Figure 5: The E⁄ect of reducing Switching Costs on the Gap between Equilibrium and
Ramsey Prices.
14are settled below marginal costs. Figure 4 provides support for this policy recomendation,
showing that equilibrium prices can get closer to Ramsey levels when access charges are
reduced. It is clear that, according to our simulations, lowering access charges even below
marginal termination costs permits us to increase social welfare. However, this is not the
only policy intervention that can be evaluated. Figure 5 shows the e⁄ect of an alternative
policy intervention where the authority reduces transportation costs, making it easier to
switch from one service provider to another. For example, one of such policy interventions
would be the implementation of number portability policies, that permit a consumer
to switch the phone service provider keeping the same phone number. Our simulations
shows that this policy intervention is even more e⁄ective than access charge regulation in
generating equilibrium prices closer to the Ramsey benchmark case.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we studied the competition between two interconnected ￿rms providing com-
munication services in a context where consumers are related through a social network.
Taking as a benchmark the standard regulatory case, where access charges are ￿xed at
marginal termination cost levels, we showed that network structure a⁄ects consumer and
producer surplus. In this setting we have performed a welfare comparative analysis be-
tween two di⁄erent regulatory interventions departing from the standard regulation. The
policies considered were: (1) Setting access charges below marginal termination costs and,
(2) Reducing switching costs between service providers.
The main di⁄erence with the existing literature is that the analysis was performed
using a model where rational consumers are related through a social network, and then
the number of calls between any pair of them depends not only on prices and transportation
costs, but also on how socially close they are in the network.
The results showed that equilibrium prices, consumer surplus and producer surplus
depend on the connectivity parameter d, showing that social networks matter in the way
how markets perform and also how regulation should be accomplished. For example,
regulation seems to be mandatory, but its importance depends on the social network
characteristics, because the collusive scenario, associated to monopoly outcomes, is more
pro￿table and has higher impact on consumer surplus for higher connectivity degrees in
the social network.
In relation to the regulatory interventions, our results showed that setting access
charges below marginal costs have a positive impact on competition, reducing equilib-
rium prices to consumers. However, an alternative policy intervention, oriented to reduce
switching costs, was much more e⁄ective, because it brought ￿nal prices closer to a sec-
ond best solution, the Ramsey approach. In this line, policies such as number portability
appear as highly desirable in telecommunication markets.
156 Appendix
6.1 AI: De￿nition of M
In this section we want to de￿ne a valid upper bound M such that (8) be an alternative
representation of (7). We need to consider two cases:
Case I. Consider ￿rst the case when bi < 0. In such a case we want agent i to have
the incentive to choose ￿i = 0. According to (8) if he or she chooses ￿i = 1 the second
inequation in (8) is violated. But we also need to be sure that by choosing ￿i = 0 the
binding constraint is the ￿rst one. In order to do that we need to select an M su¢ ciently
high such that the second inequation in (8) is always satis￿ed when ￿i = 0. In e⁄ect:
0 ￿ bi + M , ￿bi ￿ M but:















































￿i ￿ ￿ ￿ 1










Case II. An analogous argument leads us to show that when bi > 0, the constraint is
equivalent to select ￿i = 1 when M is su¢ ciently high, and a feasible selection of M is
obtained from:
0 ￿ bi ￿ M , M ￿ bi but:




























10If individual i is disconnected from the social network, then, whithout loss of generality, he can be











Assuming again that individual i is connected to the network and considering the










So when the upper and lower bounds for the feasible prices for ￿rms A and B are the
same, M = MCaseI = MCaseII otherwise M is selected as the biggest of them.
6.2 AII: A Feasible Algorithm
The algorithm developed permit us to study a more general case than the one used in the
paper where both, access charges and ￿nal prices, are de￿ned by the equilibrium solution
of a two stage noncooperative game ￿. In the ￿rst stage the ￿rms simultaneously and
non cooperatively select access charges in a range [amin;amax] de￿ned by the regulatory
authority, while in the second, ￿rms compete in prices in the presence of the selected access
charges, with payo⁄ functions given in (9) and (10) and subject to the constraint that
customers are making optimal a¢ liation decisions. Of course, the regulated environment
is a particular case where the authority de￿nes amin = amax.
Given the set of parameters and the realization of the taste random variables (xi)i2I, a
feasible procedure to get the Nash equilibrium of the two stage game ￿ consists in ￿nding
the second stage reaction functions. The main di¢ culties to apply standard optimization
tools is that the constraint is discrete and that the vector z in equations (9) and (10)
depends on the vector of prices.
The numerical study was performed by medium scale simulations. The social network
was modeled by random regular graphs (see Bollobas (2001)). The access charges and
prices varied in a prede￿ned grid G in the range: [amin;amax];[pmin;pmax]. The method-
ology for the simulations was the following:







1) Generate random graph g with ￿xed degree d.
2) Generate random vector of network preferences: x = (xi)i2I:
3) For each pair of access charges aA;aB in the grid over [amin;amax]:
(a) For each pair of prices pA;pB in the grid over [pmin;pmax]:
i) Compute indi⁄erence points: x￿(pA;pB) = (x￿
i(pA;pB))i2I:
17i. Select ￿(pA;pB) satisfying the constraint in (9).
ii) For the selected ￿ in (ii) we can write the pro￿ts for ￿rms A and B as:
￿A(pA;pB;aA;aB);￿B(pA;pB;aA;aB):
(b) Compute prices response functions: p￿
A(pB;aA;aB);p￿
B(pA;aA;aB):
















pute access charges response functions a￿
A(aB) and a￿
B(aA):
5) Compute Nash equilibrium access charges a￿
A;a￿
B:































9) Repeat steps 1) to 8) for a statistically signi￿cant number of graphs.
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